

2 September 1976

NOTE TO: D/OPEI

ATINTL [REDACTED] seem to have different views as to the sequence in which PAID and the Admiral should interact regarding the comments of Hank Knoche on the Lebanon paper. [REDACTED] is planning to discuss further actions on the paper with the Admiral, and it seems to me that before [REDACTED] makes up his mind regarding next steps on the Lebanon report he should have the benefit of our views as contained in the attached memorandum. I suggest we get the attached memorandum to [REDACTED] this morning so that [REDACTED] can see the whole package as we visualize it.

ATINTL

ATINTL

STATINT

ATINTL [REDACTED]

Attachment a/s

SECRET

IC 76-2378/1
1 September 1976

NOTE FOR: Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community

K1A FROM: [REDACTED] Chief, Production Assessment and
Improvement Division, Intelligence Community Staff

VIA: Director of Performance Evaluation and Improvement

SUBJECT: Lebanon Report

1. In his note to you on the Lebanon report, Mr. Knoche suggested several changes to the package, which we have now made. Specifically, we have deleted any reference in the report to the DDO cryptonym, RYBAT, and retyped the CIA cables, eliminating all data except the Director address line and message text. We have also redone the proposed letter from you to CIA, addressing it now to Mr. Knoche-- at his request.

2. I don't entirely agree with Mr. Knoche's comment that "those who required the info had it." That only holds true for Washington area authorities. As the report notes, the U&S Commands and the Commander, Sixth Fleet did not know of the situation until two hours after word reached Washington. I would also suggest we reserve judgment on Mr. Knoche's comment that the report may be too long-- until we hear from State.

3. As a next action, I suggest we send the entire package to Hal Saunders, informally asking for his personal comments (attached), just as you did with Knoche. This course has two benefits: it puts State on notice that we consider this an issue, but does so in a way which solicits and encourages Saunders' help rather than resistance. And it also is a low-key way to get State's review on the accuracy of the report and perhaps their permission to use the State EXDIS cable information.

4. After we hear from State, I propose these next steps:

-- Formally send the report to CIA and State.

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- Plan to raise the subject for discussion at NFIB, together with some similar CRITIC/NOIWON problems we encountered in the Korean situation--all as part of the same basic problem. (Mr. Knoche also suggests a look at Korea.)

5. New subject: With inputs from us and the other participating agencies, DIA is preparing a wrap-up on how well the Korean Task Force functioned, and we should have this in a few days. After that we will be in a position to evaluate the Task Force performance in some further detail and also recommend some changes to the Sitrep procedures now in abeyance.

M



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Attachments:

SC 01346-76 w/att

Note to Mr. Saunders w/att (not included)

CIA cables (3)

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